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Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal
in real social dynamics [Muchnik, et al., Sci. Rep. 3, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community
structure is ubiquitous in biological and social networks [M. E. J. Newman, Nat. Phys. 8, 25
(2012)]. Motivated by these facts, we here consider the evolutionary Prisoner’s dilemma game
taking place on top of a real social network to investigate how the community structure and the
heterogeneity in activity of individuals affect the evolution of cooperation. In particular, we account
for a variation of the birth-death process (which can also be regarded as a proportional imitation
rule from social point of view) for the strategy updating under both weak- and strong-selection
(meaning the payoffs harvested from games contribute either slightly or heavily to the individuals’
performance). By implementing comparative studies, where the players are selected either randomly
or in terms of their actual activities to playing games with their immediate neighbors, we figure out
that heterogeneous activity benefits the emergence of collective cooperation in harsh environment
(the action for cooperation is costly) under strong selection, while it impairs the formation of
altruism under weak selection. Moreover, we find that the abundance of communities in the social
network can evidently foster the fixation of cooperation under strong-selection, in contrast to the
games evolving on the randomized counterparts. Our results are therefore helpful for us to better
understand the evolution of cooperation in real social systems.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 89.75.Hc
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation means that one individual pays a cost for
another to receive a benefit, which is essential for con-
structing new levels of organization in biology and soci-
ety [1, 2]. The emergence of genomes, cells, multi-cellular
organisms and human society are all based on coopera-
tion [3]. In fact, “natural cooperation” has been pro-
posed to be regarded as a third fundamental principle
of evolution beside mutation and natural selection [4].
Evolutionary game theory is the powerful mathematical
framework for modeling evolution in biological, social,
and economical systems [5–7]. In the standard setup
of evolutionary game theory, strategies available for the
game are represented by a fraction of individuals in the
population. Individuals then collect payoffs according to
the rules of the game, which will be measured in terms
of reproductive fitness. Reproduction can be either ge-
netic or cultural. In the latter case (usually describing
social situation), the strategy of someone who does well
is imitated by others.
The most prominent metaphor to study the evolu-
tion of cooperation is given by the Prisoner’s dilemma
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(PD) [8, 9]: in pairwise interactions, cooperation pro-
vides a benefit b to the partner at some cost c to the co-
operator (b > c), while defection neither bears any costs
nor provides any benefits. In an unstructured popula-
tion, where all individuals are equally likely to interact
with each other, defectors have a higher average payoff
than unconditional cooperators. Therefore, natural se-
lection increases the relative abundance of defectors and
drives cooperators to extinction.
Only in the presence of additional incentive mecha-
nisms can cooperative behavior that increases the fitness
of others at a cost to oneself be promoted by natural se-
lection. One of the mechanisms is based on population
structure [10], which can lead to clustering of cooperating
agents (or social viscosity). Such mechanism is also ex-
plained as spatial (or network) reciprocity [1]. In the past
decade, with the booming development of network sci-
ence [11, 12], much attention has been devoted to evolu-
tionary games on complex population structures charac-
terized by complex networks, where the nodes represent
individuals and links represent social relationships [13–
15]. Many topological characteristics of complex net-
works, such as the power-law distribution of interac-
tion degree [16], the clustering coefficient [17–21], degree-
degree correlation [22], are proven to have great effects
on the evolutionary success of cooperation.
One of the most common and important features of a
social network is community structure [23–25], the divi-
sion of network nodes into groups within which the net-
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2work connections are dense, but between which they are
sparser [see Fig. 1(a) for a typical real social network].
The strength of the community structure can be quanti-
fied by using a modularity measure [26], which for a ran-
dom network will be close to zero, and will be close to one
for a strong community structure. Though community
structure is ubiquitous in social and biological networks,
it is not enough clear until now whether the community
structure promotes or inhibits cooperation. Evolutionary
PD game on complex networks with community struc-
ture have been studied only rarely. In Ref. [27], Chen
et al. studied the PD on community networks, but fo-
cused mainly on how varying the inter-community links
affects cooperation. Along similar lines, recent work by
Lozano et al. [28] suggests the inter- and intra-structure
of the communities influence the evolution of coopera-
tion in social networks by raising or lowering the level of
cooperation and the stability of the behavior of the com-
munities against changes on the temptation to defect.
More recently, in Ref. [29], the authors studied the PD
game on community network and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) ran-
dom graphs, and found that community structure usu-
ally inhibits cooperation. We note that the community
network in [29] is actually composed of two ER random
graphs with a few links connecting them, which shouldn’t
be regarded as a good candidate for real social systems.
On the other hand, recent empirical studies suggested
that heavy-tailed distributions (usually of power-law
form) of human activities are universal in real social dy-
namics [30–33], which means that a significant number of
individuals are much more active than most others. In-
spired by these two things, i.e., evident community struc-
ture and heterogeneity in individual activity in social net-
works, we in this work intend to study evolutionary PD
games on a real social network with distinct communities
and with heterogeneous individual activity. Our main
purpose is to figure out how such typical ingredients of
real social systems affect the evolution of cooperation.
II. MODEL
Let us first introduce our networked game model. We
will focus our attention on evolutionary PD games on
the collaboration network of network scientists [34]. The
largest connected component in this collaboration net-
work contains N = 397 nodes with M = 914 connections
among them (see Fig. 1). The strength sij of the social
tie (or contact weight) between two nodes i and j can be
reasonably formulated as described in [37]
sij =
∑
k
δki δ
k
j
nk − 1 , (1)
where δki in the numerator is 1 if scientist i was a coauthor
of paper k and zero otherwise, and nk in the denominator
is the number of coauthors of paper k involving scientists
i and j. The activity of individual i is therefore conve-
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Graphical illustration of (a) the collab-
oration network of network scientists [34] (note that only the
largest connected component of the network is shown, which
contains N = 379 nodes and M = 914 links), and of (b) a
synthetic community network with 15 distinct communities
(comprising of N = 400 nodes and M = 858 links), generated
by means of the method proposed in [35]. The nodes with dif-
ferent colors belong to distinct communities, as revealed using
the community detection algorithm VOS Clustering [36]. (c)
The average activities and mean degree of nearest neighbors
as a function of the nodes’ interaction degree display clear
positive (or assortative) correlations. (d) Heavy-tailed distri-
butions of the node degree and activity of the collaboration
network. Note that the measures in (c) and (d) are calculated
for the whole collaboration network containing N = 1589 noes
and M = 2742 links.
niently defined by summing the contact weight over all
adjacent neighbors as Ai =
∑
j∈Ωi sij . Note that Ai is
no other than the total number of papers that individual
i has coauthored with others.
Each player i occupies a vertex of the collabora-
tion network, and engages in pairwise interactions to
collect a payoff, Pi, from game interactions within its
neighbors, as specified by the underlying interaction
network. Initially, all the individuals can choose either
to cooperate or to defect with equal probability. A
cooperator pays a cost, c, for each neighbor to receive
3a benefit, b. A defector pays no cost and provides no
benefit. The payoffs accrued in the game interactions
by the players will influence their reproductive fitness
(or the propensity to propagate their strategies). For
simplicity, we adopt a rescaled payoff matrix such that
there is only one single parameter for the PD with all
the original properties retained
C D
C 1 0
D 1 + c/b c/b,
where c/b is the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperative
behavior [1]. Following [9], we assume that the fitness
(or performance) of an individual is given by a constant
term, denoting the baseline fitness, plus the payoff that
arises from the game. In particular, the fitness of a
player i is given by fi = 1 − w + wPi, where w weighs
how the payoffs acquired from the game interactions
contribute to the fitness, thus w measures the intensity
of selection. Strong selection and weak selection corre-
spond, respectively, to the cases of w → 1 and w  1,
which describe the situations that the payoff is either
large or small compared to the baseline fitness. The idea
behind weak (strong) selection is that many different
factors contribute to the overall fitness of an individual,
and the game under consideration is just one (the most
important one) of those factors [9].
The evolutionary process is preceded by implement-
ing a variation of birth-death process for the population,
comprising the following elementary steps. I) fitness ac-
cumulation process. In this stage, the players are allowed
to interact with their neighbors with certain probabilities
to collect profits, which will constitute their evolutionary
fitness. To take into account explicitly the heterogeneous
activity of individuals, we select players proportional to
their activities to take participating in game interactions.
For the sake of comparison, we also consider the case that
at each time step all the individuals are chosen randomly
to playing games. In both cases, one Monte Carlo step
(MCS) consists of all the players having interacted with
their neighbors once on average. II) Birth-death (or re-
production) process. After every MCS, each player re-
produces ki + 1 (where ki is the interaction degree of i)
offsprings, and ki of them are dispersed to those imme-
diate neighboring sites and one left in the original site.
Subsequently, all the old individuals are chosen to die,
and the new born offsprings will compete for the empty
sites in proportion to their fitness, and only one individ-
ual is allowed to survive on each site after the competi-
tion. Note that the number of competing individuals on
site i is still ki + 1. Thus, the probability of a cooperator
wining on site i reads as
FC
FC + FD
=
∑
j∈Ωi(C) fj∑
j∈Ωi(C) fj +
∑
k∈Ωi(D) fk
, (2)
where Ωi(C) [Ωi(D)] denotes the set of neighboring co-
operators (defectors) of i (including itself) before repro-
duction. From the social point of view, the considered
birth-death process can be reasonably regarded as a “pro-
portional imitation” rule, where the strategies with bet-
ter performance in ones neighborhood are more readily
to be imitated by the focal individual in the subsequent
round.
Since in finite populations evolution is stochastic so as
that the combination of selection and random drift even-
tually leads to fixation of one of the strategies, we iterate
the above discrete-time dynamics for a large number of
MCS, until the system gets into one of the two absorbing
state: fixation of cooperation (composed of only cooper-
ators) or fixation of defection (composed of only defec-
tors). Our key quantity is therefore the average fixation
probability of cooperators, which is determined by the
fraction of runs where cooperators reached fixation out
of 105 independent runs.
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
It is convenient for us to use some abbreviations
for the following discussions. Hereinafter, “WeakRan”
and “WeakAct” (“StrongRan” and “StrongAct”) mean
that the game dynamics is under weak-selection (strong-
selection) and the individuals are picked randomly or in
terms of their actual activities to playing PD games, re-
spectively.
Let us first explore how cooperation evolves on the col-
laboration network under weak-selection. The average
fixation probability of cooperation fc as a function of the
cost-to-benefit ratio c/b in 105 independent realizations
is featured in Fig. 2(a) for both cases of WeakRan and
WeakAct. As expected, the smaller the value of c/b is,
the less costly being a cooperator is, and thus the larger
the probability of fixation to cooperation on the system
is. As c/b increases, defection becomes more and more
preferable, and the fixation probability of cooperation is
vanishing. From Fig. 2(a), we see that under weak se-
lection, fc in the case of WeakRan is greater than that
in the case of WeakAct, suggesting that the heteroge-
neous activity of individuals does harm to the emergence
of cooperation in the entire range c/b > 0.
For weak-selection, we have adopted w = 0.01 in cal-
culating the fitness of individuals, i.e., the payoffs reaped
from game interactions contribute very little to the re-
productive capability. Consequently, the competition be-
tween different strategies behaves mainly like the random
drift process. In such situation, if the players are picked
in terms of their activities to playing games in each MCS,
only a few players have the chance to harvest gains (sup-
pose the extreme case where only the player with highest
activity is always chosen). As such, during the reproduc-
tion process, many sites will be occupied randomly by co-
operators and defectors, owing to the fact that nearly no
payoff is gained from game interactions (and remind that
the baseline fitness for all players is the same), which is
definitely detrimental for the dispersal of cooperation. In
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Average number of independent runs
ending in all cooperators, i.e., the fixation probability of co-
operation fc, as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b for
the PD game taking place on the collaboration network of
network scientists [34]. (a) and (b) correspond to the cases
of weak-selection w = 0.01, and strong-selection w = 1.0, re-
spectively. The pluses and crosses in each panel are for the
results where the individuals are selected at random (Ran) or
in terms of their activity (Act) to playing PD games with the
adjacent neighbors. The data are yielded by implementing
105 different realizations.
contrast, if the players are selected randomly to playing
games, cooperative behavior could be encouraged since
for small c/b mutual cooperation produces the highest
group profits and more chance to participating in game
interactions would promote the competing capability of
cooperators (especially those clustered cooperators).
In fact, as will be shown below in Figs. 3 and 4, un-
der weak-selection, any constraint on strategy diffusion,
either by the presence of communities in the underlying
interaction network or choosing players to playing games
in terms of their activities, will diminish the chance for
cooperators to expand in the population, hance impair
the emergence of cooperation.
Next, we report our simulation results on collaboration
network with strong-selection. As shown in Fig. 2(b),
we observe a crossover behavior of fc as a function of
c/b under StrongRan and StrongAct. Specifically, when
the value of c/b is sufficiently small, the average fixation
probability of cooperators under StrongRan is greater
than that under StrongAct, similar to as found in the
case of weak-selection. However, as c/b goes beyond a
certain value, say c/b ≈ 0.078, we get the reverse result
that cooperation is more favored under StrongAct than
under StrongRan. We argue that the presence of commu-
nity structure in the collaboration network contributes to
the crossover behavior.
Under strong-selection (w = 1.0), the payoffs gathered
from game interactions will determine totally the repro-
duction success of the strategies. For sufficiently small
c/b, cooperative behavior is quite cheaper and the benefit
for unilateral defection is very slim. Mutual cooperation
will enable the involved cooperators to gain a sustainable
competitive advantage. As a consequence, more chance
to take part in games means more opportunities for coop-
erators to take over defecters. Accordingly, for small c/b,
selection of players to playing games with equal chance
is most likely to support cooperation, in comparison to
any other biased selection manners.
For sufficiently large c/b, cooperative behavior be-
comes very expensive and will be doomed to extinction.
For large value of c/b where cooperators have certain,
yet small, probabilities to taking over the whole popula-
tion, say 0.08 < c/b < 0.16 in Fig. 2(b), how the play-
ers participate in game interactions will affect the fate
of cooperation. For instance, for large c/b, a few com-
munities composed of players with large activities may
occasionally dominated by cooperators. Once such situ-
ation is realized, it will become fairly difficult for these
communities to be invaded by defectors, given that the
players are selected to playing games in terms of their
activities (i.e., the StrongAct case), since the players in
these communities are more likely chosen to collecting
payoffs through game interactions [note that the degree-
activity and degree-degree correlations are both positive
(see Fig. 1), and remind that connections within commu-
nities are very dense, but between which connections are
quite sparser]. Thus, as compared to the case of Stron-
gRan, cooperators have a more promising future in the
case of StrongAct for large c/b.
So far, we have analyzed how the heterogeneity in in-
dividuals’ activity impacts the evolution of cooperation.
We evidenced that under weak-selection, heterogeneous
activity always plays a detrimental role in the emergence
of cooperation (since it impedes the dispersal of coopera-
tive behavior), while under strong-selection, it is helpful
for the surviving and expanding of cooperation when co-
operative behavior is costly. The positive role of hetero-
geneous activity in sustaining cooperation for large c/b
is partly due to the community structure present in the
underlying social interaction network.
In order to better understand how community struc-
ture influences the evolution of cooperation, we next
make comparative studies of our current game model on
the collaboration network and on its randomized coun-
terparts. We used the method proposed in [38] to gen-
erate randomized versions of the collaboration network.
Specifically, the edges connecting different nodes in the
original network are repeatedly exchanged such that the
distinct community structures are expunged as much as
possible, while keeping the degree of each vertex un-
changed. No self-connections and isolated networks are
allowed in the edge exchange process.
In Fig. 3 we show the average fixation probability fc
of cooperators in randomized collaboration networks as a
function of the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b for different game
dynamics. The data shown in Fig. 2 are also replotted for
comparison. In the case of WeakRan, we observe that the
topological structure of the interaction network does not
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FIG. 3. Average number of independent runs ending in all
cooperators, i.e., the fixation probability of cooperation fc,
as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b for the PD game
taking place on the real collaboration network as shown in
Fig. 1(a) (crosses), or on its randomized counterparts (pluses).
(a) and (b) are for the weak-selection case w = 0.01, and (c)
and (d) for the strong-selection case w = 1.0, respectively.
The arrow marks the position c/b = 1/(k¯ + 2) ' 0.147 (here
k¯ = 914× 2/379 ' 4.823), predicted by Eq. (4), below which
the fixation probability of cooperation should be 1 given that
the PD game is running on a random regular graph of infinite
size. Others are the same as in Fig. 2.
affect much the evolutionary outcome. The symbols for
the two networks nearly coincide with each other. This
is somewhat expected, since as mentioned before, in the
limit of weak-selection, the evolution of cooperation is
mainly driven by random drift, and the structure of the
underlying interaction network plays as a less important
role in determining the fate of cooperation when all the
players are chosen with equal chance to playing games.
From Fig. 3(b), we perceive that under weak-selection, if
the players are selected to participate in games in terms of
their activities, the presence of communities in the under-
lying interaction network actually undermines the advan-
tages of cooperators, owing to the fact that cooperation
could be easily locked in the communities, in contrast to
the case of randomized network, where cooperative be-
havior has a better opportunity to spread out.
The above dynamical scenario reverses if we con-
sider the game dynamics under strong-selection. From
Figs. 3(c) and (d), we clearly see that cooperation is more
easily to emerge in social networks with distinct com-
munities than in the randomized counterparts. As ex-
plained before, under strong-selection where the payoffs
from game interactions matter heavily in determining the
reproduction success, the presence of communities in the
underlying interaction network (once occupied by coop-
erators) will provide their members with a stable source
of benefits, which ultimately allows them to resist cycles
of invasions from defectors. In particular, the promotion
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Average number of independent runs
ending in all cooperators, i.e., the fixation probability of co-
operation fc, as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b
for the PD game taking place on the synthetic community
network as shown in Fig. 1(b) (crosses), or on its random-
ized equivalents (pluses). The arrow marks the position
c/b = 1/(k¯ + 2) ' 0.159 (here k¯ = 858 × 2/400 = 4.29),
predicted by Eq. (4), below which the fixation probability of
cooperation should be 1 given that the PD game is running
on a random regular graph of infinite size. Others are the
same as in Fig. 2.
of cooperation due to the presence of communities in the
real social network under StrongRan [Fig. 3(c)] is actu-
ally not surprising, since in otherwise “well-mixed case”
(games on the randomized network) natural selection al-
ways favors defectors over cooperators. Under StrongAct
[Fig. 3(d)], though those more active players would have
great chance to get higher profits in the randomized net-
works if they all adopt cooperation, they are actually
more easily to be exploited by defectors because of their
excessive exposure to others, which in return tends to
weaken the expanding of cooperation. If instead they
are confined to the communities, whenever mutual co-
operation is occasionally emerged among them, the co-
operative communities may last for long period of time,
which supplies further opportunities for the cooperators
to strike back in the competition with defectors and even
to dominate the whole population .
It is worthy noting that in the limit of weak selection,
by considering the spatial structure of the population,
Ohtsuki and Nowak [39] have derived the so-called spa-
tial replicator equation for evolutionary PD on a random
regular graph of degree k, which describes how the av-
erage frequency of each strategy changes over time. Re-
markably, they found that moving a game from a well-
mixed population onto a regular graph simply results in
a replicator equation with a transformation of the payoff
matrix, whose element is the sum of the original pay-
off matrix plus another matrix, which describes the local
competition of strategies [39, 40]. For our current PD
6model with the rescaled payoff matrix and with propor-
tional imitation, if we denote by x the density of cooper-
ators in the population, then its derivative with respect
to time in the case of WeakRan should read as [39]
x˙ = x(1− x) k
(k + 3)(k − 2) [1− (k + 2)c/b], (3)
where k is the degree of the regular graph. Note that
Eq. (3) is derived for the game on a graph of infinite size.
Thus, cooperators always win over defectors under the
condition
1− (k + 2)c/b > 0⇒ c/b < 1
k + 2
. (4)
In other words, evolutionary dynamics on random regu-
lar graphs can favor cooperation over defection provided
c/b < 1/(k + 2). In Fig. 3(a), we also mark the position
c/b = 1/(k¯ + 2) [k¯ is the average degree of randomized
counterparts of the collaboration network in Fig. 1(a)],
blow (above) which the fixation of cooperation should go
to 1 (0). The reason that fc does not reach 1 is due to
the fact that we here consider the PD on a very small
system with N = 379 (actually, even for infinite sys-
tem size, evolutionary stability on sparse graphs does not
imply evolutionary stability in a well-mixed population,
nor vice versa [40]), and the randomized counterparts of
the collaboration network are not strictly random regu-
lar graphs at all (because of the heterogeneity in node
degree).
Finally, as a further check, let us compare the PD game
taking place on a synthetic network with explicit commu-
nity structures and on its randomized equivalents. The
synthetic community network [Fig. 1(b)] is generated ac-
cording to the algorithm proposed in [35]. To include het-
erogeneity in activity, we assign the activity of each node
i by the power of its degree as k1.5i . The evolutionary re-
sults are reported in Fig. 4. Once again, we obtain qual-
itatively similar results as summarized in Fig. 3, i.e., the
presence of communities in the interaction network facil-
itates the fixation of cooperation under strong-selection,
while suppresses it under weak-selection.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, we have studied the Prisoner’s dilemma
game on top of a social network with distinct community
structure and on its randomized equivalents. By letting
the profits collected by a player after playing with its
neighbors to constitute its evolutionary fitness (or per-
formance), we are able to formulate the problem in an
evolutionary form. By incorporating realistic ingredients
of real social systems into the game dynamics, we have
explored how the heterogeneous distribution of individual
activities and the presence of communities in the under-
lying interaction network affect the evolution of cooper-
ation under both weak- and strong-selection. Our main
findings are: I) The heterogeneity in individual activities
can benefit the emergence of collective cooperation in
harsh environment (the action for cooperation is costly)
under strong-selection, while it undermines the forma-
tion of altruism under weak-selection or under strong-
selection provided cooperative behavior is inexpensive;
II) The presence of community structure in the under-
lying interaction network always promotes the evolution
of cooperation under strong-selection, while it plays as
an opposite role under weak-selection. Since the pro-
posed evolutionary rule (4) can be reasonably regarded
as a proportional imitation rule, we believe the proposed
model is relevant for real social dynamics, and hence the
presented results are helpful for us to better understand
the evolution of cooperation in our human society, where
heterogeneous activities and community structures are
general and ubiquitous.
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